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A B S T R A C T
In this paper we develop a new market design for the German electricity market. Our new market design si-
multaneously ensures security of energy supply and ongoing expansion of renewable energy (RE). The metho-
dological approach applied considers the special challenges resulting from the intermittent nature of RE ‒ we
simulate developments in the German electricity market between 2015 and 2034 and diﬀerentiate across various
power plant technologies according to their ability to ﬂexibly react to changes in the residual load. In theory, a
composition of power plants that is optimally adapted to residual load always leads to the most cost eﬃcient
supply of electricity. However, our empirical analysis demonstrates that this does not necessarily lead to an
improved market environment, both in terms of power plant proﬁtability as well as uninterrupted power supply.
1. Introduction
Compared to the rest of the world, German consumers largely enjoy
a secure electricity supply (deﬁned as a permanent and sustainable
coverage of demand for electricity). The average ‘unavailability’ of
electricity per customer in 2012 was 15.91min (Federal Network
Agency, 2013). Uninterrupted delivery needs to be ensured both during
peak load hours, as well as in the event of technical problems that lead
to unexpected downtimes of (conventional and renewable) power
plants (BMWi, 2012). In this context, an undergoing transformation of
German energy policy poses major challenges to uninterrupted elec-
tricity supply in the near future. On the one hand, the gradual phasing-
out of nuclear power, as decided by the German government in early
2011 after the events in Fukushima, is expected to lead to a consider-
able reduction of conventional generating capacity (Bundesgesetzblatt,
2011). Moreover, as a result of increased air quality standards, some
older coal-ﬁred plants will also shut down (European Union, 2010;
BDEW, 2012). On the other hand, the increasing infeed of renewable
energy (RE) also represents a further threat to the security of electricity
supply. In order to counteract the expected strong ﬂuctuations caused
by RE reliance, it will be necessary to have a signiﬁcant amount of
controllable power plant capacity. Due to its close to zero marginal
costs and the priority purchase obligation for its use, the increasing
amount of RE does, however, lead to a reduction in the market price of
electricity and the displacement of conventional power plants (Lang,
2007; Wüstenhagen and Bilharz, 2006; Federal Ministry of Justice,
2014). Hence, the proﬁtability of conventional power plants may de-
teriorate to such an extent that many power plant operators are forced
to consider closing down their plants (Sensfuß et al., 2008; Sorge,
2013).
Against this background, the ability to maintain a high level of
supply security is already endangered in some regions in Germany
(Amprion et al., 2013), with substantial energy deﬁcits expected in the
medium to long term (Matthes, 2012). As a temporary countermeasure,
the German Federal Government has introduced a provision for pro-
curing power reserves. Under this provision (and in return for an ap-
propriate remuneration), those power plants considered to be indis-
pensable for maintaining the security of supply are kept as a reserve
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outside the actual energy markets (Federal Ministry of Justice, 2013a,
2013b). Provisions for interruptible loads represent a further measure
for ensuring a stable supply of electricity. Such provisions for inter-
ruptible loads would oblige energy-intensive companies to reduce their
amounts of demand for a certain period in exchange for an agreed re-
muneration (Federal Ministry of Justice, 2013c). Such regulations are
seen as temporary solutions with the intention to introduce a funda-
mentally new design for the electricity market in the near future. The
goal of the new market model is to ensure a permanently secure supply
without having to compromise on further expansion of RE.
To our knowledge, our analysis provides the ﬁrst attempt to develop
a new market design that simultaneously ensures security of energy
supply as well as ongoing expansion of RE. In contrast to the existing
literature (e.g. Nicolosi, 2012; Peek, 2012a, 2012b; Batlle and Rodilla,
2010; Boot and van Bree, 2010; Briggs and Kleit, 2013; Cramton et al.,
2013; Gottstein and Schwartz, 2010; Keay-Bright, 2013; Meyer et al.,
2014; Matthes et al., 2012; Neuhoﬀ et al., 2013; Perkins, 2014), the
methodological approach applied here explicitly considers the special
challenges resulting from the intermittent nature of RE ̶ we simulate
developments in the German electricity market between 2015 and 2034
and diﬀerentiate across various power plant technologies according to
their ability to ﬂexibly react to changes in the residual load. Accord-
ingly, the paper provides new insights both to the scientiﬁc community
and policy makers; this can serve as guidance for selecting adequate
instruments that simultaneously ensure a stable security of supply and
the extension of renewables in a sustainable manner.
In the next section we present current alternative views on the need
for a new market design, as well as review relevant energy models in
the literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical approach to the de-
velopment and subsequent analysis of a new market model, based on
the considerations put forward in Section 2. Section 4 analyses the need
and practicality of new market designs using empirical data. Finally,
Section 5 summarises our main ﬁndings.
2. Electricity market designs: mechanisms and adequacy
2.1. The German energy-only market: concepts and background
information
As the current electricity market in Germany is operating on the
basis of actual (rather than potential i.e. available capacity) production,
it is commonly referred to as an energy-only market. In relation to the
total amount of electricity consumed, a relatively small proportion is
traded on the spot market; the greater part is procured by direct supply
contracts (Garz et al., 2009). However, regardless of the form of the
contract, all prices are geared to those on the spot market, as deviations
would provide scope for arbitrage.
In line with microeconomic theory, an operator oﬀers the output of
a power plant at its marginal cost (Varian, 2004). On the energy ex-
change market, all bids are collected and ranked in an ascending order
according to individual marginal costs (oﬀering prices; see Bode and
Groscurth, 2006). This produces a prioritisation scheme for power
plants with diﬀerent marginal costs, which is termed the merit order
(MO), and corresponds to the supply curve of the electricity market.
The energy exchange accepts bids, beginning with the lowest ones, until
the demand-side quantity of electricity is met (Henriot and Glachant,
2013). The price of electricity is determined by the last bid accepted
that satisﬁes demand (Wirth, 2013). According to peak load pricing
theory, the peak demand price must be above the marginal cost of the
most expensive type of power plant in order to ensure that these plants
can cover their capital costs (Pillai, 2010). Basically, the marginal costs
of a conventional power plant depend upon its net eﬃciency, the re-
spective fuel and CO2 emission costs, and other variable operating and
maintenance costs (Lang, 2007). Fig. 1 displays the MO (supply curve)
for conventional power plants and the corresponding demand for
electricity on the energy exchange spot market.
RE in Germany is largely incentivised through the country's
Renewable Energy Sources Act (“Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz” - EEG).
Under this act, operators of renewable energy power plants are paid for
the generation of their supplied electricity (by the transmission network
administrators) according to ﬁxed tariﬀs set by the state (Lesser and Su,
2008; Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012). Elec-
tricity from RE is generally subject to a prioritised arrangement in
Germany. Under this arrangement, the operators of public transmission
networks must positively discriminate in favour of electricity generated
by renewables, before purchasing electricity generated from other en-
ergy sources (Federal Ministry of Justice, 2014). Since the introduction
of the amended EEG in 2014, new RE power plants are expected to
carry out a mandatory level of direct selling depending on their in-
stalled capacity. On the exchange market, this green energy is traded on
an equal footing with conventionally produced electricity and sold at
the same price.
In general, RE has minimal marginal costs in the form of variable
operating and maintenance costs. Typically, when the electricity gen-
erated from RE is traded on the energy exchange market, this leads to
signiﬁcant changes in the MO (Paraschiv et al., 2014). The diagram
below shows that, owing to its marginal costs close to zero, the addi-
tional supply of RE is at the leftmost end of the MO-curve, thereby
resulting in the original supply function shifting to the right and the
equilibrium electricity price falling - this is commonly referred to in the
literature as the merit order eﬀect (MOE) (Sensfuß et al., 2008; Felder,
2011; Henriot and Glachant, 2013). The MOE of RE is dependent upon
the gradients of the supply and demand curves on the one hand, and the
quantity of RE provided on the other.
This downward eﬀect of RE on spot market prices can be observed
even when the generated quantity of RE is not traded on the energy
exchange market. Owing to the aforementioned obligation of trans-
mission network operators to give priority to RE during electricity
procurement, the infeed of electricity generated from RE results in a
reduced demand on the spot market (when the latter is not traded on
the energy exchange market, see Felder, 2011). In this context, one
should note that the demand for electricity is relatively inelastic with
respect to changes in prices (at least in the short term – this corresponds
to a steep demand curve, as depicted in Figs. 1 and 2; see also Sioshansi,
2008).
2.2. A Review of the literature
There is an ongoing heated debate on whether energy-only markets
oﬀer suﬃcient economic incentives to permanently ensure a stable
electricity supply. Elberg et al. (2013), Cramton, Ockenfels (2012) and
Joskow (2006) claim that the energy-only market can fail due to a very
price-inelastic demand. They point out that the vast majority of cus-
tomers are not “smart metered” (i.e. not using a time-of-use metering
Fig. 1. Schematic supply and demand curve on the spot market.
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structure, and, hence, their actual electricity purchases per hour are not
measured), which prevents billing them according to the current
(hourly) price of electricity on the spot market. Instead, these customers
pay a pre-deﬁned average electricity price for their total consumption
that does not reﬂect current availability or the actual price of supply.
Accordingly, there is no incentive for them to reduce demand in times
of very limited supply, which may result in blackouts or forced outages.
Likewise, Cramton et al. (2013) identify low demand ﬂexibility as a
central problem of electricity markets, since consumer unawareness of
real-time prices impedes adequate reactions and, thus, results in a
highly price-inelastic demand. They add that this, in turn, hinders es-
tablishing market-clearing prices, which represent a crucial prerequisite
for eﬃcient generation capacity (and its corresponding mix). According
to Boot and van Bree (2010), smart meters can stimulate demand re-
sponses to varying prices, and speciﬁc contracts may enable consumers
to level oﬀ peaks and troughs. Therefore, they recommend to view
smart meters as an integral part of existing infrastructure, rather than as
an object of individual choice.
In contrast, Müsgens and Peek (2011) and Dyllong (2013) argue
that, at least in Germany, approximately 60% of all customers can ac-
tually react to price signals on the current market. They support this by
pointing out that, in the German market, a signiﬁcant share of con-
sumers already have smart meters or an appropriately conﬁgured
electricity purchase agreement that enables them to inﬂuence price
developments on the wholesale market.
A further, often cited, argument to support the view that the existing
energy-only market is not suﬃcient to ensure supply security in the
long term is the so-called “missing-money” problem (Rodilla and Batlle,
2012; Hogan, 2005; Tietjen, 2012). This term refers to the fact that the
price levels determined on energy-only-markets (according to the
merit-order-principle described above) are too low to provide suﬃcient
incentives for investment in new power plants. According to Cramton
et al. (2013), wholesale markets fail to generate prices that reﬂect the
opportunity cost consumers place on electricity consumption in times of
fully utilised capacity. The term Value of Lost Load (VoLL) refers to the
price consumers would be willing to pay to avoid blackouts (Tietjen,
2012). However, since they are unable to recognise situations of ex-
treme scarcity, the VoLL cannot inﬂuence prices adequately. As a result,
merit-order prices with an inelastic demand are too low to cover the
cost of all power plants involved.
In addition, the ever-increasing feed-in of RE inevitably leads to
declining electricity prices on the wholesale market. Cludius et al.
(2014) estimate the price eﬀect of wind and photovoltaic electricity
generation in Germany between 2008 and 2012, and ﬁnd that each
additional GWh of renewable electricity fed into the grid reduces the
price on the electricity day-ahead market by 1.1–1.3 €/MWh. In 2006,
the associated total value of the price eﬀect resulting from RE exceeded
the net support payments for RE generation according to EEG (Sensfuß
et al., 2008). While consumers beneﬁt from the increase in renewable
electricity, the operators of conventional power plants pay the bill of
this structural shift: the proﬁtability of conventional plants suﬀers
signiﬁcantly from lower spot market prices (Henriot and Glachant,
2013). Milstein and Tishler (2009) also show that, due to optimal re-
sponses of electricity producers to demand ﬂuctuations, under-
investment in competitive electricity markets is inevitable: instead of
building new capacity that remains idle during long periods of time,
producers let the electricity price spike. For this reason, in many mar-
kets a price cap is introduced (Elberg et al., 2013). However, if this
price cap is set too low, the operators of peak load power plants, which
are exclusively used during times of high demand, in turn do not earn
suﬃcient margins.
The “missing money problem” is also recognised by Müsgens and
Peek (2011), but they add that its impact can be mitigated by the use of
diﬀerent ﬂexibility and adaptation mechanisms both on the supply and
demand side. On the supply side, they list increasing electricity imports,
the utilisation of emergency generators, the reactivation of power
plants in cold reserve, and retroﬁt measures for existing facilities to
extend their service life and increase their eﬃciency. On the demand
side, instruments for ensuring short-term security of supply include a
reduction of exports, the increased use of smart metering and improved
eﬃciency in energy use (eﬃcient equipment) (Gottstein and Schwartz,
2010).
3. Methodological approach
In this section we present the theoretical underpinnings of our
model of the German electricity market. We develop a reference elec-
tricity market design that represents the status quo, as well as a new
market design. An underlying key assumption is that conventional
electricity is fully traded on the spot market. Furthermore, there is no
transnational trade in electricity – we focus exclusively on the German
market. Section 3.1 describes the model that represents the status quo
of the electricity market. Section 3.2 describes the modelling of our new
market design.
3.1. Load duration curve model
In order to analyse the impact of a new electricity market design on
the economics of conventional power plants, a basic electricity market
model (the Load Duration Curve Model, LDCM) is taken as a starting
point (Poulin et al., 2008; Turner and Doty, 2007; Geiger, 2010). The
LDCM is based on the Residual Load Duration Curve (RLDC) and the
MO. It allows to determine electricity prices and to calculate con-
tribution margins of power plants. According to the RLDC, the hourly
electricity demand in MW for the entire 8760 h a year is depicted in
descending order. The quantities demanded correspond in each in-
stance to total demand less the RE infeed RE. Fig. 3 depicts a typical
RLDC for the German electricity market.
A typical MO-curve of conventional power plants (for the German
electricity market) is depicted in Fig. 4. Corresponding to the
Fig. 2. Eﬀects of an increasing amount of renewable energy on the spot market.
Fig. 3. Residual load duration curve (Own depiction based on EEX, 2010–, 2013, EEX,
2010– 2014).
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methodology described earlier, the MO has been created according to
increasing marginal costs of available power plant capacities.
By linking RLDC and MO, it is possible to determine the applicable
prices for electricity (for the hourly amounts of demand in a year).
Electricity prices for each MW supplied, as identiﬁed from the MO, are
assigned to the respective electricity demand of the RLDC. On that
basis, electricity prices for the demanded quantities are allocated to the
corresponding duration in hours (of equivalent demanded quantities).
This derivation leads to the so-called Price Duration Curve (PDC). Fig. 5
graphically summarises such a procedure.
Based on the PDC, the contribution margins of each power plant in
the spot market can be determined by means of integral calculus. Fig. 6
displays the Price Duration Curve (PDC) together with the marginal
cost curve (MCPPi) of a power plant PPi.
The contribution margin (CM) of power plant (PPi) per MW of in-
stalled capacity is given by the following equation:






where x= number of yearly production hours
di= production hours (power planti).
Taking into account each power plant's full capacity (CPPi) in MW,
the total contribution margin (TCM) of (PPi) can be deﬁned as follows:
= ∙TCMPP CPP CMPP .i i i (2)
Taking into consideration the annualised ﬁxed costs of a power





















where superscript n refers to the year of production, nop represents the
operating lifetime of PPi and dr represents the discount rate.
3.2. New electricity market design
The new electricity market design is based on the idea that both the
electricity price and the proﬁtability of conventional power plants are
signiﬁcantly dependent on the level of adaptation of conventional
power plants to RE supply. Against this background, a methodology is
utilised that makes it possible to model the most cost-eﬀective com-
position of a conventional power plant complex. The upper chart of
Fig. 4. Merit order curve (Own depiction based on WestLB, 2009).
Fig. 5. Load Duration Curve Modell (Own Depiction).
Fig. 6. Price Duration Curve and Power Plant's contribution margin.
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Fig. 7 depicts the hourly electricity demand in MW in descending order
for the entire 8760 h of a year. While the grey curve depicts the total
electricity demand (Total Load Duration Curve or LDC), the green curve
shows the diﬀerence between total demand and the infeed from RE.
This remainder of the demand is equivalent to the Residual Load
Duration Curve (or RLDC). In the bottom part of Fig. 7, the total annual
cost per MW of base-load (BLPP), medium-load (MLPP) and peak-load
power plants (PLPP) are shown as a function of their periods of use.
Typically BLPPs are nuclear or lignite power plants that are built to
operate the entire year on a full-time basis. Hard coal, Combined Cycle
Gas Turbines (CCGT) and Gas Turbines (GT) can be considered as
MLPPs. These power plants have lower starting- and shut-down times
and can thus be utilised more ﬂexibly. PLPPs, such as oil power plants,
are able to operate particularly ﬂexibly and are hence utilised to meet
the highest demands during a day. The intersections of the three curves
with the ordinate represent the annual ﬁxed costs for each class of
power plants. The slopes of the curves reﬂect the marginal production
costs.
The intersections I1 and I2 of the curves delineate the periods of use,
during which a change of power plant class leads to lower total annual
costs. The red curve (eﬃciency cost curve) indicates the type of power
plant technology that can satisfy the respective levels of demand for a
given annual number of hours at the lowest total cost. The optimal
composition of the conventional power plant complex as shown in the
top left of Fig. 7 can be determined by transferring the intersections I1
and I2 to the demand curves. The quantities TB, TM and TP in the grey
bar represent the optimal mix of conventional BLPP, MLPP and PLPP
for an electricity market that does not include RE. The capacities RB, RM
and RP in the green bar represent the most cost-eﬀective mix of con-
ventional types of power plants satisfying the RLDC, i.e. for a power
system with a signiﬁcant proportion of RE.
Assuming that the complex of conventional power plants is opti-
mally adapted to the infeed of electricity from RE, the corresponding
(long-term equilibrium) electricity price can be derived from the eﬃ-
ciency cost curve shown in red (Fig. 7). The slope of this curve corre-
sponds to the marginal cost of the most cost-eﬀective type of power
plant for each respective amount of electricity demanded. The example
provided by Fig. 7, therefore, indicates that (regardless of the supply of
RE) the price of electricity corresponds to the marginal costs of a PLPP
and MLPP during the P and M time intervals respectively (apart from
the peak load pricing mechanism). By contrast, the number of hours,
during which the marginal costs of BLPP determine the price of elec-
tricity, diﬀers depending on the amount of RE infeed. Without taking
RE into account, the price of electricity during the B time interval is
equal to the marginal costs of a base load power plant. The average
price of electricity PT, given the optimal adaptation (to RE) of a con-
ventional complex of power plants to the LDC, can thus be described as
follows:
=




where MCP=Marginal Costs of PLPP
MCM=Marginal Costs of MLPP
MCB=Marginal Costs of BLPP
Peak=Peak Load Pricing.
As described above, by generating electricity from RE, a part of the
base load is covered ̶, consequently, the RLDC becomes zero or negative
during certain hours with high RE production (above BRE). The price of
electricity PRE, therefore, corresponds to the marginal cost of a BLPP
only during the BRE time intervals (and for operating hours exceeding
BRE the price of electricity becomes zero):
=





because BRE< B, PRE< P. In summary, it can be shown that for an
optimal adaptation of a conventional power plant complex, the infeed
of RE leads to a reduction in the average price of electricity.
The impact of a sub-optimal adaptation of a power plant complex to
the infeed of RE can also be illustrated using Fig. 7. The power plant
complex depicted in the grey bar (top part of Fig. 7), which has been
optimally conﬁgured for the LDC, serves here as a point of reference. In
contrast to the initial approach, however, we now make the assumption
that a strong expansion of RE is successful; as a result, the actual de-
mand corresponds to the RLDC depicted in green. In such a scenario,
there is a signiﬁcant excess capacity of BLPPs. This implies that the
number of hours, where the relatively low marginal costs of a BLPP
determine the price of electricity, is now clearly larger (see BSUB area,
where BSUB>B). During the remaining amount of hours MSUB, the
price corresponds to the marginal cost of an MLPP. The existing PLPPs
are no longer needed and do not, therefore, determine the price at any
time. In addition, the existing excess capacity impedes shortage pricing
during peak loads. Summing up, a sub-optimal adaptation of a power
plant complex to the infeed of RE results in a signiﬁcantly lower
average price for electricity (denoted by PSUB):
=





Fig. 7. Eﬀects of RE on the optimal composition of the complex of power plants (Own
Depiction based on Nabe, 2006, Weber and Woll, 2007, Wissen and Nicolosi, 2008, Miera
et al., 2008, Fürsch et al., 2014).
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where PSUB< PRE< P.
The new market design incorporates these interdependencies. While
the supply side initially consists of the same conventional power plants
as in the reference market design, for each consecutive year, the com-
plex of power plants is modelled to be optimally adapted to RLDC (thus
representing the most cost-eﬀective composition of diﬀerent power
plants). As a next step, for each of the 8760 h per year, the most cost-
eﬀective power plant technology is selected, allowing us to derive the
eﬃciency cost curve. As demonstrated earlier on in Fig. 7, at the kinks
along the eﬃciency cost curve, the corresponding threshold number of
operating hours are linked to the RLDC in order to calculate the
equivalent amount of installed capacity of each power plant tech-
nology. This corresponds to the optimally adapted (to RE supply)
complex of power plants, which is then compared to existing real
conventional power plant capacities. The capacities of those power
plants in the market are allocated on the basis of optimal adaptation
guidelines. In case there is need for additional capacity of a particular
power plant technology, these quantities are complemented by the
excess capacity of remaining technologies, again according to optimal
adaptation guidelines.
In case that excess capacities fail to meet the entire demanded
quantity, an investment (in additional capacity) is made to optimally
ﬁll the gap. This assumes that necessary investments materialise within
the next year (in reality, one might a expect a longer time lag between
the decision to build a new power plant and the time it goes into op-
eration ̶ relaxing this assumption does not alter substantially our later
ﬁndings regarding observed diﬀerences between the two electricity
market designs). If, on the contrary, the existing power plant capacity
exceeds the optimal adaptation level, redundant power plants are not
allowed to oﬀer their capacities in the market. Based on this allocation
of production capacities, the proﬁtability of power plants (that are in
the market) is again modelled by utilising the LDCM.
4. Simulations
4.1. Data
Our analysis considers the period between 2015 and 2034. The
forecast of German electricity demand is based on reported data from
the European Energy Exchange (EEX, 2010–2013). For the years
2010–2013, the hourly average electricity demand is calculated, which
is then projected to remain stable until 2034. It is assumed that de-
mand-increasing developments (e.g. in the form of electric mobility) are
counterbalanced by increasing energy eﬃciency (later on, we relax this
assumption and carry out a sensitivity analysis). Assumptions con-
cerning the future installed capacity of RE are based on the expansion
goals of the German Federal Government (Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety, 2012).
As to availability, bioenergy and geothermal energy are assigned a
customary availability factor of 0.9, while the availability factor of
hydroenergy is 0.4 (Möst et al., 2012). The availability factors of solar
and wind energy are calculated based on time series analyses. For this
purpose, the real hourly production of solar and wind energy for the
years 2010–2014 is compared to the maximum potential production per
hour (EEX, 2010–2014). The future hourly production of RE is then
represented by the product of the assumed future capacity installed and
the respective average hourly availability factor. Subtracting the total
hourly RE production from the corresponding total demand results in
the residual demand. This quantity depicts the demand that is left to be
met by conventional power plants. The depiction of the conventional
complex of power plants is based on data from the Federal Network
Agency (2015). To account for any unavailability of plants, as well as
start-up and shut-down periods, the installed capacity of each power
plant is reduced by 10% (Enervie, 2014). Economic and technical data
of existing power plants are mainly based on empirical data that have
been collected within the research department of the German bank
WestLB (WestLB, 2009) (any missing data of existing power plants are
determined by linear interpolation).
Through the application of the LDCM (see Section 3), the proﬁt-
ability of each German power plant is determined for the years
2015–2034 (at each point in time, a ﬁctive complex of power plants is
modelled for the next ten years that follow). During this period of time,
power plant shutdowns according to their assumed life cycle are taken
into consideration. To account for peak load prices, the prices on the
spot market are increased by 5%. A weighted average cost of capital
equal to 7.14% is used as the discount rate (Enervie, 2014). On this
basis, the NPV of each power plant (at each point in time)is calculated
for the ﬁctive time span of ten years. In addition, an optimisation
modelling is executed in order to identify the NPV maximising invest-
ment capacity in MW in each of the following power plant technologies:
Lignite, Hard Coal, Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) and Gas
Turbines (GT).
Apart from power plants that are taken out of production due to
technical reasons, the decommissioning of power plants due to eco-
nomic considerations is modelled as well. In this context, we assume
that a power plant is shut down in case its NPV is negative for ﬁve years
in a row. Both power plant shutdowns, as well as new investments, are
assumed to take eﬀect in the subsequent year, respectively. Finally,
Fig. 8 shows the total cost curves of the six power plant technologies
under consideration (i.e. nuclear energy, lignite, hard coal, CCGT, GT
and oil) for the starting year 2015.
4.2. Model-based results
In this section we compare the model-based results of both the re-
ference and the new market mechanisms. The presented simulations are
based on the benchmark projections (constant electricity demand over
time, increasing CO2 prices (on average 8% per year), a discount rate of
7.14% and an electricity price markup of 5%).
4.2.1. Development of conventional power plant capacity
Fig. 9 displays the total installed capacity of conventional power
plants, as well as the RLDC between 2015 and 2034 for the reference (r)
and the new market mechanism (n). In the reference market me-
chanism, a very large number of power plants are expected to shut
down after ﬁve years. As Fig. 10 reveals, the reason for this decom-
missioning of capacity is largely due to economic ineﬃciency and only
partly to power plants reaching the end of their lifecycle. For the re-
maining years, there is no further decommissioning as a consequence of
economic ineﬃciency, which is mainly driven by nuclear energy being
phased out (with the last nuclear power plants shutting down by 2022;
see also Bundesgesetzblatt, 2011). Overall, investments generally re-
main low ‒ investment in lignite and CCGT power plants, in particular,
lead to a NPV maximising solution only for certain years. The results
indicate that, in the reference electricity market design (that tries to
capture the current market conditions as close as possible), there are
not suﬃcient economic incentives that guarantee an adequate amount
of power plants to meet residual load.
The new electricity market design reveals a diﬀerent picture. For the
majority of years, there is a suﬃcient amount of conventional power
plant capacity to meet residual load. It is only for very few years that
supply falls below demand. As described in the previous section, in the
new electricity market design, investments are not made based on a
modelling of NPV maximisation, but instead on a complex of conven-
tional power plants optimally adapted to residual load. For this reason,
in each year following disinvestments due to economic ineﬃciency,
there is a suﬃcient amount of replacement investment to meet demand.
In summary, the new electricity market design leads to a higher level of
supply that, in most cases, is suﬃcient to meet demand.
4.2.2. Average annual electricity price
Fig. 11 shows the average annual electricity price both for the
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reference market design and the new electricity market design.
As one can see, the hypothesis that a conventional complex of power
plants that is optimally adapted to residual load always leads to a
higher average electricity price (compared to a sub-optimally adapted
complex) cannot be conﬁrmed by the empirical results. Fig. 12 de-
monstrates that, in the new electricity market design, the average
electricity price is mostly lower than in the reference market design. In
2020, there is a signiﬁcant increase to more than €150 per MWh due to
large disinvestments (of more than 40.000MW in the previous year).
Due to these decommissioning activities, the installed capacity in 2020
is not suﬃcient to meet demand. As a consequence, all remaining
power plants in the market are operating at full capacity all year round,
so that the price is always set by the ‘high marginal cost’ oil power
plants. In the following years, the price returns to a level of around €25
per MWh because of strong investments primarily in ‘low marginal cost’
lignite power plants. This price level remains quite constant apart from
the years 2026 and 2032, during which the price increases to more than
€150 per MWh. These increases are again caused by large disinvest-
ments in the previous years, which lead to a lack of capacity in the
market (and once again, subsequent replacement investments help the
average electricity price return to lower levels).
To sum up, there is no support of the hypothesis that the new
electricity market design leads to a higher electricity price. On the one
hand, the utilisation of power plants in the new market design is strictly
oriented towards an optimally adapted complex of power plants. This is
simply because it would be unrealistic to exclude existing power plants
in the market design. On the other hand, the average electricity prices
in the reference market design tend to be biased, since during the
period between 2020 and 2034, energy demand exceeds supply, forcing
hence all power plants of a particular year to operate at full capacity.
Therefore, the number of hours per year, where the price is set by ‘very
high marginal cost’ power plant technologies is also outstandingly high.
4.2.3. CO2 emissions
In order to evaluate the actual diﬀerence in CO2 emissions between
the new and the reference electricity market designs, it is necessary to
calculate the annual CO2 emissions per MWh. This is because, in the
reference market design, the installed conventional power plant capa-
city is mostly insuﬃcient to meet residual load, while, in the new
electricity market design, the opposite holds (see Fig. 9). Fig. 12 shows
Fig. 8. Total cost curves of conventional power plants in the year 2015 (Own Depiction based on Elberg et al., 2012 and WestLB).
Fig. 9. Installed conventional power plant capacity and residual load duration curve, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projection.
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that the CO2 emissions per MWh in the two market designs start more
or a less at the same level during the ﬁrst three years. Thereafter, the
CO2 emissions per MWh produced in the new electricity market design
(green curve) are consistently between 5 and 10 per cent lower than in
the reference market design (black curve). For the last three years of the
period under consideration, the CO2 emissions per MWh produced in
the new market design decline rapidly due to investments in low
carbon-emitting technologies.
4.2.4. Total costs of conventional electricity production
The total costs of conventional electricity production consist of the
annualised ﬁxed costs of power plants and the product of marginal
costs, operating hours and available power plant capacity. Due to the
diﬀering amounts of electricity produced, it is meaningful to compare
the reference and new electricity market designs by looking at the re-
spective cost per MWh. Fig. 13 shows that these costs are almost on the
same level of around €40 per MWh between 2015 and 2029. Subse-
quently, total costs per MWh rise in 2030 for both market designs, due
to the increasing cost of CO2 emissions.
Summing up, the assumption that a complex of conventional power
plants better adapted to residual load necessarily leads to higher cost
eﬃciency cannot be conﬁrmed by the empirical results.
4.2.5. Proﬁtability of conventional power plants
The average proﬁt per MW of installed capacity for each type of
power plants is depicted (for the reference- and new electricity market
designs) in Fig. 14. For the reference electricity market design, lignite
power plants are consistently proﬁtable over the entire period under
investigation. Nuclear energy power plants are also consistently prof-
itable, though on a lower level, until they become decommissioned as
they reach the end of their lifecycle in 2022. With the highest marginal
costs, oil power plants do not have suﬃcient operating hours to achieve
positive proﬁtability, and, as a result, they become decommissioned
after ﬁve years of operation in 2020. Gas and hard coal power plants
display ﬂuctuating proﬁtability. In the ﬁrst years, hard coal power
plants only reach slightly positive proﬁtability and corresponding ﬁg-
ures for gas power plants are consistently negative. This is because gas
and hard coal power plants are often setting the price, which results in
low contribution margins. With increasing CO2 emission costs in later
periods, this pattern is somewhat reversed. Between 2021 and 2028,
both types of power plants are operating with a proﬁt thanks to a
combination of low capacity and moderate CO2 emission costs.
The new electricity market design shows a diﬀerent picture. In
2020, 2026 and 2032 (years characterised by a substantial lack of ca-
pacity in the market, see Fig. 9), proﬁtability drastically increases up to
€1.2 million per MW of installed capacity. This is because power plants
in these years are able to operate full time, which results in high con-
tribution margins. With the exception of lignite and nuclear energy
power plants during the ﬁrst ﬁve years and oil power plants in the
remaining period, all other technologies operate with a loss. This is
because (for most years) a very high proportion of base load power
plants operate in the market. These technologies are characterised by
low marginal costs, so that prices become too low to reach suﬃcient
contribution margins. Overall, the simulation results conﬁrm that the
Fig. 10. Decommissioning and investment in conventional power plants and residual load duration curve, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projection.
Fig. 11. Average annual electricity price, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projection.
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new electricity market design results in lower power plant proﬁtability
than the reference market design. Thus, a complex of power plants
optimally adapted to residual load does not lead to an improved eco-
nomic environment.
4.2.6. Sensitivity analysis
Finally, we carried out a sensitivity analysis of the reference and
new market mechanisms (results available from the authors upon re-
quest) for diﬀerent electricity demand (benchmark, constant,
+ /− 0.50%/year) and CO2 price scenarios (benchmark, constant,
doubling, halving). Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis show
that increased CO2 emissions costs do not reduce the proﬁtability of
power plants (as these costs can be transferred to electricity prices).
Modest variations in electricity demand also do not have a substantial
eﬀect on the installed capacity of conventional power plants. We found
electricity prices to be largely insensitive to the changes in electricity
demand and carbon emission costs. We also considered alternative
scenarios corresponding to a halving of the discount rate as well as a
doubling of markup prices. These alternative scenarios improve prof-
itability of power plants and thus installed capacity signiﬁcantly in both
market designs - while increased markup prices increase the average
electricity price by a similar magnitude, a lower discount rate has the
opposite eﬀect.
5. Conclusions
There is a continuously increasing infeed of renewable energy in the
German electricity market. However, due to the intermittent nature of
renewable energy supply, a signiﬁcant amount of conventional power
plants is still needed to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply. As a
Fig. 12. CO2 Emissions per MWh, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projection.
Fig. 13. Total costs in € per MWh, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projection.
Fig. 14. Average proﬁt per MW installed capacity, reference- and new electricity market design, benchmark projectio.
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result of its close to zero marginal costs (and hence drop in the average
electricity price), renewable energy leads to a displacement of con-
ventional power plants, which poses a threat to the security of elec-
tricity supply in the medium- to long-term. Against this background,
researchers and policy-makers pay increasing attention to the suit-
ability of the current electricity market design and potential changes to
address the current shortcomings.
In this paper we developed a new market design based on the idea of
a complex of conventional power plants that is optimally adapted to
residual load. In theory, such a composition of power plants always
leads to the highest possible average electricity price and the most cost
eﬃcient supply of electricity. We provide simulation results based on
empirical data that refute the hypothesis that an optimised complex of
conventional power plants is more cost-eﬃcient and leads to a higher
average electricity price. Our analysis reveals that the mere orientation
of existing power plants to an optimally adapted solution is not suﬃ-
cient to achieve an improved market environment and ensure unin-
terrupted power supply.
Our analysis has shown that, under the current market conditions, a
large amount of power plants cannot operate proﬁtably, and, as a re-
sult, the security of supply cannot be guaranteed in the medium to long-
term. This outcome emphasises the need for further research and in-
creased policy attention. We highly recommend that policy makers
reconsider their current RE and conventional energy policy. Policy
makers should concentrate attention on the economic eﬀects of dif-
ferent approaches to achieve RE expansion and security of supply; this
will assist them in obtaining more accurate estimates about the
monetary costs and environmental impacts of electricity generation in
the future.
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